SMU Law Review
Volume 3
Issue 3 Survey of Texas Law for the Year 1948

Article 5

January 1949

Wills and Estates
Samuel E. Daugherty

Recommended Citation
Samuel E. Daugherty, Wills and Estates, 3 SW L.J. 275 (1949)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol3/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

1949]

SURVEY OF TEXAS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1948

275

WILLS AND ESTATES
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS ANCILLARY PROBATE

OF FOREIGN WILLS

Nams

v. Duncan' in addition to being an interesting case

from the standpoint of the facts involved, shows a very good
application of Article 8305,2 which provides that when a foreign
will recorded in Texas gives an executor power to sell real estate
situated in this state no order of court shall be necessary to authorize the executor to make sale and execute a proper conveyance.
In this case the conveyance in question was made in 1906 by an
executor acting under authority of letters taken out in Pennsylvania. Article 8305 was not passed until 1915, and the conveyance
was attacked on the grounds that the statute did not apply since it
was not in effect at the time the conveyance was made. The
Supreme Court held that the statute did apply, pointing out that
Article 8305, was enacted as Article 7878a of the revised statutes
of 1911, and that following it, as Article 7878b, was a validation
act which validated all sales and conveyances previously made,
where duly filed and recorded, as if they were made and recorded
after the passage of this act.
CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS-RIGHTS OF SURVIVOR

UNDER JOINT AND MUTUAL WILL

In Harrell v. Hickman' the court agreed that the joint and
mutual will validly executed in question was contractual as well as
testamentary in character which follows the well established rule to
that effect.' There is one significant point in the case, however, and
1

_

_ Tex .............- 215 S. W. (2d) 599 (1948).

2 TF.X. REv. Crv. STAT.
3

__

Tex....

(Vernon 1925) art. 805.
215 S. W. (2d) 876 (1948).

4 Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex. 618, 193 S. W. (2d) 876 (1946), noted in 169 A. L R. 1
(1947) ; Larrabee v. Porter, 166 S. W. 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) writ of error refused;
Moore v. Moore, 198 S. W. 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) writ of error refused.
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while it presents nothing new, it is a point that may often be overlooked. The court points out that there is a distinction to be drawn
between an absolute fee or conditional fee (sometimes called a
defeasable fee) and a life estate with a power of sale conveyed in
a joint and mutual will, and that the rights of the survivor under
each are considerably different. It appears that the rule is that
where the will is construed to be an absolute conditional or defeasable fee the survivor has absolute power to dispose of the
estate without any regard for the remaindermen, while if the will
is construed as conveying a life estate with a power of sale, the
survivor is limited to "good faith" conveyances "for the sole use
and benefit of the survivor." Of course, as to just what kind of an
estate is created by the will is a matter of construction to be drawn
from the particular language used in the will.
In this case H and W-husband and wife-executed the will in
question. W died first and H took under the will. Several years
later H conveyed by deed (for $10.00 and love and affection)
400 acres of land to his second wife and later died. A devisee of
the land under the will of H and W claimed this conveyance was
fraudulent as to her because the will of H and W was a joint
and mutual will, executed by the testators in pursuance of an
agreement and that the survivor took only a life estate with a
power of sale. The court said the language of the will' devised an
absolute fee simple to H limited only by paragraph four of the
will' which had the effect of turning it into a conditional or defeasable fee, the condition being that if H should die seized of
any property, it would go to the various institutions and persons
named in the will.
The opinion distinguished Nye v. Bradord7 as being a case
5 "We give, bequeath and devise to the survivor of us... all our property, real, personal and mixed for the sole benefit of the survivor of us."
o "After the death of both of us ... the remainder of our property, of which the survivor of us shall die seized and possessed shall be disposed of as follows:" then follows
bequests to institutions and individuals.
l 144 Tex. 618, 193 S. W. (2d) 165 (1946).
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where the survivor became a life tenant with authority to sell the
property. Speaking of the Nye case the court said:
"It was our holding that a power to sell and thereby defeat the remaindermen, does not include the power to accomplish that result
by a gift,""
and of the instant case,
".... the phrase 'for the sole use and benefit of the survivor of us .. .'is
not a restriction or limitation upon the right of the survivor, but to the

contrary, it affirmatively excludes the theory that the survivor should
hold for the use and benefit of any other person. '
JOINT AND

MUTUAL

WILLS-VALIDITY

WHERE

INEFFECTIVE AS TO ONE PARTY

In Graser v. Graser0 H and W-husband and wife-executed,
in 1930, a joint and mutual will which purported to dispose of
the bulk of their community and only estate."' The instrument
was entirely in the handwriting of H, but was signed by both H
and W and also a third party, but there was nothing in the nature
of an attestation clause. H died in 1932 and the instrument was
probated as his will, W procuring appointment of herself as administratrix and taking benefits under the will. Then, in 1939
W died and five of the children sought to probate the instrument
as her will, which was denied, because it was not holographic or
properly witnessed as to her, and no appeal was taken from that
judgment. Administration was had on W's estate and both it and
the proceedings incident to her prior deceased husband's estate
were closed before the present litigation. Two of the children
(defendants in this action and who would take more by W's
s............
Tex ...........
215 S. W . (2d) 876, 879 (1948).
9 Ibid.
10 ...........
Tex .............
215 S. W. (2d) (1948).
11

"9-10-30
Waco, Texas
"This is our last will and testament that we agree the last living from us both shall
keep part lot 6-7, 94 ft 100 and all the notes and cash money on hand. The other propperty shall be devidet as follows:" the gifts to the various children follow.
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intestacy) took the position that while the instrument was the
will of their father, it was not the will of their mother, who accordingly, and in fact as adjudged by the probate court, died
intestate. The trial court upheld this contention of the two children
that W died intestate.
The Court of Civil Appeals of the tenth district reversed the
trial court and held that the children took under the will.12 The
court said:
"Therefore, it is quite clear to us from all the words actually used in

the instrument as a whole and from all the extrinsic evidence properly
relating thereto, that it was the intention of both parents in the execution

thereof to evidence thereby their joint and mutual will made in pursuance of their bilateral agreement therein expressed to the effect that
both and each did thereby jointly and mutually agree to give, devise
and bequeath to the survivor of them a life estate in their common
property, with remainder to their several children as therein specified.
We think it is immaterial that Mrs. Graser might have executed the
;ame [will] under such circumstances as to render it invalid as her
separate and individual will, or that for any reason such instrument
might have been revocable or unenforceable as a testamentary contract
during the lifetime of the husband, because the indisputed evidence
shows that neither she nor her husband attempted to revoke the same
as to repudiate the agreement therein contained but each and both
consistently acted thereon until the time of the death of each as if it had
been in all respects mutually binding upon both. That being true it is

our opinion that the parties to this suit are now estopped from denying
the validity or binding effect of the instrument as it was originally
executed..."Is

The court further pointed out that the law is well settled in
Texas that where a husband and wife make a joint and mutual
will pursuant to contract between them by which each devises to
the other a life estate in their common property with remainder
to their children the survivor becomes bound thereby if he or she
accepts benefits accruing under such contract and will. (Citing
cases).
12212 S. W. (2d) 859 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) rehearing denied.
18 Id. at 864; see footnote 11 supra, for the language used in the will.
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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Civil Appeals and held that the terms of the instrument were not
enforceable against the community interest of W either as a will
or as a contract. The instrument was not the will of W, for it was
not validly executed as to her, and the judgment of the probate
court denying it probate was final and conclusive. It was not a
case for application of the doctrine of election, because it was
the will of H only and as such did not purport to dispose of the
community interest of W. The instrument showed that H believed
that, as executed by both him and W, it would operate to pass
both community halves according to its terms; but the fact that
W accepted benefits under the will which she would not otherwise
have enjoyed, realizing that H believed that it was also her will,
was held not to be sufficient equity on which to bind her half of
the estate. But it was contended by the respondents that it was
not merely a matter of accepting benefits under the will of H with
knowledge of his expectations, but was also a matter of a contract
by W, evidenced by the terms of the instrument, and which neither
she nor her heirs might equitably repudiate after full performance by H and acceptance by W of the benefits of such performance. For this proposition respondents relied upon Larrabee v.
Porter4 and other decisions in which mutual wills validly executed
by both parties were enforced against the survivor or the survivor's
successors in interest on the ground of equity arising out of a
contract performed by the death of the first testator to die and
acceptance of the benefits thereof by the surviving testator.
Respondents contended that since all the elements of contract, performance, and acceptance of benefits thereunder were present in
this case, the community interest of W became bound by the
terms of the instrument, even though it failed as her will. But the
court held that to enforce the terms of the instrument as the contract of W would be violative of the provisions of Article 4610,"
14 166 S. W. 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) writ of error relused.

15 Tx. REv. CIV.

STAT.

(Vernon 1925) art. 4610, which provides that parties intend-

ing marriage may not enter into an agreement "the object of which would he to alter
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in that the terms of the instrument would have the effect of altering the legal orders of descent with respect to the children of H
and W. It was stated that inasmuch as spouses may, generally
speaking, dispose of their property respectively by conveyance
or by will, including mutual wills, in such manner as they see
fit, without regard to the legal orders of descent and even to the
extent of disinheriting their children, it would seem to be a legitimate inference that Article 4610 was designed to apply to
cases where an agreement to make a will or mutual will or wills
is not followed by actual effective execution of the necessary
6
testamentary documents. Such cases as Ellsworth v. Aldrich,"
holding that an instrument may sometimes be enforceable as a
contract though denied probate as a will were said to deal merely
with the technical effect of probate or refusal to probate and to
be no authority for the proposition that what could have been
valid in a properly executed will is necessarily valid as a contract where the will fails merely because of defective execution.
The argument was advanced by the respondents. that under
Johnson v. Durstt7 a contract in violation of Article 4610 is not
void but merely voidable; that in this case W had ratified her
contract by offering the instrument for probate as the will of H
and by taking benefits thereunder; that she thereby became
estopped to contest its validity and that the petitioners stood in
the same position. As to this, the court declared (1) that this
would deny the protection of the statute to the children, who are
the ones it was designed to benefit; and (2) that if the petitioners
had themselves been guilty of conduct raising an estoppel, possibly the argument would be valid but that it was not intended
that they should be bound by the actions of W.
The question raised by this case is one of first impression in
the legal orders of descent either with respect to themselves, in what concerns the inheritance of their children or posterity, which either may have by another person, or in
respect to their common children." The article applies to past nuptial agreements as
well as pre-nuptial agreements.
18 295 S. W. 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) writ of error refused.
17 115 S. W. (2d) 1000 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) writ of error dismissed.
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8
Texas. The petitioners relied upon the case of Ireland v. Jacobs,"
which the court said appeared to be the only one in which the
appellate court of any state had resolved the question, and which

"... is undoubtedly a holding that under circumstances substantially

the same as those of the instant case, the surviving wife took under the
instrument as the will of her husband but, despite its contractual or
'mutual' character, was not bound by her own commitments in it, since
it was defectively executed as her will."

The reasoning of that case was that the agreement between the
husband and wife failed for lack of consideration, since the
instrument was not validly executed by the wife as her will. The
Texas court observed that the rationale of that case may not be
sound and has been vigorously criticized in the state where it was
rendered, but approved its result as being in accord with our
own peculiar institutions,
".. . at least in a case like the present, where we have the additional
element of children of the deceased testators or would-be testators."

This case being one of first impression, as the Supreme-Court
pointed out, brings to mind two other interesting questions:
Query: (1) In a proper case where no children are involved
and the amount left to the surviving spouse does not fall below
his statutory share, so that Article 4610, supra, would not be
violated, in view of the observation given to the Ireland case,
supra, what will be the result in Texas?
(2) In view of the court's observations, suppose probate of the
instrument involved here had been challenged by H's relatives
on the grounds of failure of consideration. Should it have been
probated?
Samuel E. Daugherty.

Is 144 Colo. 168, 163 P. (2d) 203 (1945) noted in 161 A. L. R. 1419 (1946) and criticized by Sears, Joint and Mutual Wills, 18 RocKy MT. L. REv. 366 (1946).

